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KEEPING UP WITH THE JONESES: MAKING
SURE YOUR HISTORY IS JUST AS WRONG AS
EVERYONE ELSE’S
Brian Sawers*†
1

Before Katz v. United States, a search under the Fourth Amendment
required a trespass. If there was no trespass on one’s property, then there
was no search. In Katz, a 1967 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court abandoned
that approach, instead finding a search without a trespass based on the
2
government’s invasion of a “reasonable expectation of privacy.” In Oliver
3
v. United States, the Court found that trespass was not sufficient to create a
search. It found no reasonable expectation of privacy in open fields, and thus
no search, even though the defendant had erected “No Trespassing” signs
around his property to exclude the public, consistent with state law. After
Oliver, it seemed clear that trespass no longer equaled a search.
4
In United States v. Jones, the latest case on Fourth Amendment
searches, the Court returned to trespass as a bar on warrantless searches. It
held that attaching an electronic tracking device to an individual’s car
constituted a search. Because attaching the device constituted a trespass, it
5
was a search and the government was required to obtain a warrant. The
majority opinion and concurrences duel on whether reviving trespass in
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is wise, but all agree on the historical
point that landowners always had the right to sue for trespasses on their
property, including on open fields.
Quoting the Prosser and Keaton treatise, Justice Alito’s concurrence
asserts that “[a]t common law, any unauthorized intrusion on private

* Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of
Law. I would like to thank Brandon Garrett, David Gray, and Lee Kovarsky for their
comments.
†
Suggested Citation: Brian Sawers, Keeping Up with the Joneses: Making Sure Your
History is Just as Wrong as Everyone Else’s, 111 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 21
(2013), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/111/Sawers.pdf.
1. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
2. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
3. 466 U.S. 170 (1984). See also Dow Chemical Corp. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227
(1986) (holding that industrial plants are analogous to open fields, not a home’s curtilage, and
finding no search).
4. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
5. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949–50.
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property was actionable.” Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia agrees
that unauthorized entry in private land constituted a trespass at common
7
law.
The justices and the treatise writers are indisputably right about the
common law of England. The English law of trespass grants the landowner a
right to exclude from all private land, including empty fields and standing
timber. But the justices are wrong about American law. Landowners in early
America could only exclude others from their homes (and curtilage) and
sometimes from fenced land. Landowners could not exclude from open land;
thus, unwanted visitors to open lands committed no trespass.
A review of eighteenth-century American trespass cases shows that
unwanted intrusions on open land unaccompanied by theft were not a
trespass. Additional evidence comes from contemporary hunting law.
Hunting, especially on horseback with dogs, is more disruptive than fishing
or foraging and so generated more lawmaking. Constitutional and statutory
protections for hunting on open land reinforce the proposition that
landowners could not exclude unwanted visitors from unfenced land.
Hunting was not an exception to the rule but rather the activity most in need
of protection under the rule since the hunters were armed, killed game the
landowners might want for themselves, and could harass livestock when
hunting with dogs.
If courts are going to decide cases today based on the law in 1791, then
courts have an obligation to get the history right.
Case Law
“Trespass” appears in 409 reported cases during the eighteenth century
in what is now the United States. In the majority of cases, one party pleaded
trespass to resolve competing claims of ownership. In a few cases, someone
entered land without claiming ownership and removed timber, clams, or
8
honey. In those cases, the owner pleaded trespass when the real offense was
theft. In no reported case did a landowner sue an unauthorized intruder
merely for intruding.
The colonists who settled America came from a crowded island with
clearly demarcated boundaries and intense land use. In contrast to England’s
plentiful labor and scarce land, America was uncultivated and
underpopulated. Within a few years of settlement, every colony rejected the

6. Id. at 958.
7. Id. at 953.
8. E.g., Phelps v. Sanford, 1 Kirby 343 (1787) (logging without permission);
Proprietors of Common Land and Undivided Land in Ipswich v. Herrick, 75 Mass. (9 Gray)
529 (1772) (clamming without permission); Merrils v. Goodwin, 1 Root 209 (1790) (removing
honey without permission).
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English law of trespass and enacted new laws for a new continent. Under
the American rule, the public could travel, hunt, fish, and forage on private
land without permission, until landowners fenced their land. In addition,
stock owners could let their cattle or hogs graze on private land without
10
having to seek permission.
Early nineteenth-century cases can shed light on what rights the
landowner had over open land. We can thank John Singleton, a particularly
litigious landowner from South Carolina for two high court opinions that
show the limited rights that landowners had to exclude from open land.
In 1818, South Carolina’s highest court noted that “the right to hunt on
11
unenclosed and uncultivated lands has never been disputed.” The opinion
continued, “[I]t is well known that it has been universally exercised from the
12
first settlement of the country up to the present time.” Even though the
landowner was present and refused the hunter permission, there was no
trespass. Landowner permission was irrelevant because, as the court held, “it
is the right of the inhabitants to hunt on unenclosed lands,” and that right
13
could not be defeated by “mere will and caprice of an individual.”
Two years later, Singleton returned to the South Carolina courts when a
group of hunters entered a fallow field enclosed by a dilapidated fence.
Again, Singleton lost because landowners were required to maintain their
14
fences to preserve their right to exclude. As in the earlier case, landowner
permission was irrelevant because the hunters had a right to be there. More
explicitly than in 1818, the South Carolina court noted that England was
15
thickly settled, which was not true of South Carolina. The English rule was
“wholly impracticable” and “destructive of the interests and peace of the
16
community.”
Similarly, the Georgia Supreme Court explicitly rejected the English
rule that owners could exclude from open land, noting that rule would
17
“require a revolution in our people’s habits of thought and action.” The
English rule would mean that a “man could not walk across his neighbor’s
unenclosed land . . . without subjecting himself to damages for trespass. Our

9. E.g., Act 52, 1 Hening’s Stat. at Large 199 (1632) (replacing the English law of
trespass in Virginia).
10. Brian Sawers, The Right to Exclude from Unimproved Land, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 665,
677–79 (2011).
11. M’Conico v. Singleton, 9 S.C.L. (2 Mill) 244, 244 (1818).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Broughton v. Singleton, 11 S.C.L. (2 Nott & McC.) 338 (1820).
15. Id. at 340 (“There, almost every foot of soil is appropriated to some specific
purpose—here, much the greater part consists in uninclosed and uncultivated forest.”).
16. Id.
17. Macon & Western R.R. Co. v. Lester, 30 Ga. 911, 914 (1860).
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whole people, with their present habits, would be converted into a set of
18
trespassers. We do not think that such is the Law.”
The landowner’s right to exclude from open land was so limited that
some courts analogized open, but privately-owned, land to a common. In
South Carolina, “uninclosed land, for many purposes, such as hunting and
19
pasture, is regarded as common.” The court was quick to note the limits of
the analogy, since a landowner could “appropriate it for his exclusive use”
20
by fencing it.
Constitutional Provisions
When the Fourth Amendment was drafted, two state constitutions
explicitly guaranteed a public right to hunt on open land. Necessarily,
landowners had no right to exclude from unfenced land and thus unwanted
intrusions were not actionable.
In 1776, Pennsylvania adopted a new constitution, which guaranteed
“[t]he inhabitants of this state shall have liberty to fowl and hunt in
seasonable times on the lands they hold, and on all other lands therein not
21
inclosed.” The following year, Vermont adopted its first constitution which
guaranteed its citizens the “liberty to hunt and fowl, in seasonable times, on
22
the lands they hold, and on other lands (not enclosed).”
Interpreting a 1797 statute, the Supreme Court of Vermont held that the
“word enclosure therefore imports, land enclosed with something more than
the imaginary boundary line, that there should be some visible or tangible
23
obstruction, such as a fence, hedge, ditch or something equivalent.”
Members of Pennsylvania’s delegation to the constitutional convention
24
proposed a parallel provision along with the Bill of Rights. In the other
states, unfettered public access to open land was the norm, even if it did not
25
receive constitutional protection. More than a century later, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that it was “customary to wander, shoot, and fish” over
26
“large expanses of unenclosed and uncultivated land.”

18. Id.
19. Law v. Nettles, 18 S.C.L. (2 Bail.) 447, 447 (S.C. Ct. App. 1831) (emphasis added).
20. Id.
21. PA. CONST. OF 1776, § 43. The provision first appeared in 1683 in the second Frame
of Government. PA. FRAME OF GOV’T. OF 1683, § 22.
22. VT. CONST. OF 1777, ch. 2, § 39.
23. Porter v. Aldrich, 39 Vt. 326, 331 (1866) (interpreting 1797 fence law that allowed
for the impounding of cattle damage feasant in the landowner’s enclosure) (emphasis in
original).
24. Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of the State of
Pennsylvania to their Constituents, Dec. 12, 1787.
25. Sawers, supra note 10.
26. McKee v. Gratz, 260 U.S. 127, 135 (1922).
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Related Statutes
In the eighteenth century, legislatures shaped the boundaries of private
property law by enacting statutes that defined trespasses and acknowledged
the right to hunt on private land.
Contemporary statutes serve as evidence of what trespass meant in
1791. Dissatisfied that trespassers were rarely punished, Connecticut enacted
27
a statute for the “more Effectual Detecting and Punishing Trepass.” Under
the statute, trespass included logging another’s land without permission and
28
damaging fences. In 1791, New Hampshire passed a similar statute which,
29
in addition, penalized mining without landowner permission.
Similarly, game laws that defined where hunters needed landowner
permission are evidence of where landowners had a right to exclude. At
ratification, only one state granted landowners any right to exclude hunters
from open land, while six other states authorized hunting on open land,
regardless of landowner permission. In 1784, North Carolina imposed a fine
on hunting with guns or dogs without landowner permission east of the
Appalachian Mountains. Landowners, however, were required to post their
30
desire to exclude in at least two public places. Fishers, foragers, and
travelers remained free to use open land, regardless of landowner
permission.
In 1760, the colonial legislature of Pennsylvania responded to hunting
31
on “other people’s land.” The statute penalized hunting on “inclosed or
32
improved lands” without permission. Hunting on open land was not
proscribed, regardless of landowner permission.In 1763, New York banned
hunting in orchards, gardens, and “other inclosed Land whatsoever” within
33
New York City without landowner permission. An earlier law in Maryland
banned hunting with dogs or guns on “Inclosed Grounds” without landowner
34
permission. Connecticut banned deer hunting without permission in any
35
“Park or Inclosure.”
In New Jersey, the colonial statute did not distinguish between fenced
and unfenced land, but instead between taxed and untaxed land. In 1771,
New Jersey proscribed carrying firearms on “Lands not his own, and for
36
which the Owner pays Taxes.” At the time, New Jersey taxed only
27. 1726 Conn. Acts 329.
28. Id. at 329–30.
29. Act of Feb. 15, 1791, 1792 N.H. Laws 259, 259–60.
30. 1784 N.C. Sess. Laws 364, 365.
31. Act of Apr. 9, 1760, § 6, 1760 Pa. Laws 227, 229.
32. Id. Fowling in the streets and gardens of Philadelphia was also proscribed. Id. § 7.
33. Act of Dec. 20, 1763, § 1, 1763 N.Y. Laws 441, 442.
34. In addition to fenced land, hunters needed landowner permission on islands or
fenced-off peninsulas. 1728 Md. Laws 11, 13.
35. 1738–44 Conn. Acts 538, 539.
36. Act of Dec. 21, 1771, § 1, 1771 N.J. Laws 343, 344. Driving deer with dogs on
taxed land without permission was also banned. Id. § 2.
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37

improved land. Another provision of the same statute set property
38
qualifications for hunting on “waste and unimproved Lands,” indicating the
drafters did not think that § 1 proscribed hunting on unimproved land.
Responding to commercial hunters who took the hides but left the meat
to rot, South Carolina enacted a slightly different rule. In 1769, the colonial
legislature of South Carolina proscribed hunting without landowner
39
permission more than seven miles from home. Therefore, no landowner
40
permission was necessary for hunting within seven miles of home.
Conclusion
In the United States, landowners did not have a right of action against
people who entered open land without permission. No eighteenth-century
case shows a remedy for mere entry. Vermont and Pennsylvania
constitutionally guaranteed a right to hunt on open land. In several other
states, statutes regulating hunting implied a public right to hunt on (and, by
implication, enter) unfenced land.
Both the majority and concurring opinions in Jones are wrong about the
state of the law in 1791. Landowners in America had no right to exclude
others from unfenced land. Whether a Fourth Amendment search requires a
trespass or the violation of a reasonable expectation of privacy, government
can explore open land without a search warrant.
While the error in Jones does not affect the case’s outcome, it is
nonetheless distressing because the Supreme Court does not recognize the
limits of its historical knowledge. All but one of the justices joined opinions
that relied, at least on part, on historical errors found in a modern treatise.

37. Act of Dec. 6, 1769, § 3, 1769 N.J. Laws 317, 320 (setting rates for “All profitable
Tracts of Land held by Deed, Patent or Survey whereon any Improvements is made”).
38. Act of Dec. 6, 1763, § 6, 1763 N.J. Laws 343, 345.
39. Act of Aug. 23, 1769, 1769 S.C. Acts 275, 276.
40. M’Conico v. Singelton, 9 S.C.L. (2 Mill.) 244, 244 (1818).

